Visual Perception and the Emergence of Minimal Representation.

There is a long-lasting quest of demarcating a minimally representational behavior. Based on neurophysiologically-informed behavioral studies, we argue in detail that one of the simplest cases of organismic behavior based on low-resolution spatial vision-the visually-guided obstacle avoidance in the cubozoan medusa Tripedalia cystophora-implies already a minimal form of representation. We further argue that the characteristics and properties of this form of constancy-employing structural representation distinguish it substantially from putative representational states associated with mere sensory indicators, and we reply to some possible objections from the liberal representationalists camp by defending and qualitatively demarcating the minimal nature of our case. Finally, we briefly discuss the implications of our thesis within a naturalistic framework.

Revising the Superorganism: An Organizational Approach to Complex Eusociality.

Eusociality is broadly defined as: colonies consisting of overlapping generations, cooperative brood care, and a reproductive division of labor where sterile (or non-reproductive) workers help the reproductive members. Colonies of many complex eusocial insect species (e.g., ants, bees, termites) exhibit traits, at the collective level, that are more analogous to biological individuals rather than to groups. Indeed, due to this, colonies of the most complex species are typically a unit of selection, which has led many authors to once again apply the concept of the superorganism to eusocial insects. However, unlike Wheeler, who originally employed the concept from a physiological and evolutionary perspective, today the superorganism is typically understood only from an evolutionary perspective, using group selection. This is because of the widely held view that eusocial colonies are self-organized systems. According to this view, even the most complex eusocial systems can be explained by appealing to a set of local interactions between parts of an initially disordered system (i.e., self-organization), without the need of any hierarchical control. In this paper, we challenge the mainstream view that hierarchical control and regulation does not occur, or is not necessary, in complex eusocial colonies. Using a case study of honey bees (Apis mellifera), we develop an alternative to the self-organization approach that focuses on the hierarchical nature of the organization of complex eusocial systems-that we refer to as the hierarchical-organizational approach. In addition, we analyze how colonies of eusocial insects show a complex set of interactions between the different organisms that bring forth a new cohesive collective organization, and how in turn the constitutive entities of this collective organization are transformed in this process. This paper argues that an inter-identity (namely the superorganism) emerges at the collective level in complex eusocial colonies, such as honey bees, due to the hierarchically organized network of interactions within the colony.

Bodily Complexity: Integrated Multicellular Organizations for Contraction-Based Motility.

Compared to other forms of multicellularity, the animal case is unique. Animals-barring some exceptions-consist of collections of cells that are connected and integrated to such an extent that these collectives act as unitary, large free-moving entities capable of sensing macroscopic properties and events. This animal configuration is so well-known that it is often taken as a natural one that 'must' have evolved, given environmental conditions that make large free-moving units 'obviously' adaptive. Here we question the seemingly evolutionary inevitableness of animals and introduce a thesis of bodily complexity: The multicellular organization characteristic for typical animals requires the integration of a multitude of intrinsic bodily features between its sensorimotor, physiological, and developmental aspects, and the related contraction-based tissue- and cellular-level events and processes. The evolutionary road toward this bodily complexity involves, we argue, various intermediate organizational steps that accompany and support the wider transition from cilia-based to contraction/muscle-based motility, and which remain insufficiently acknowledged. Here, we stress the crucial and specific role played by muscle-based and myoepithelial tissue contraction-acting as a physical platform for organizing both the multicellular transmission of mechanical forces and multicellular signaling-as key foundation of animal motility, sensing and maintenance, and development. We illustrate and discuss these bodily features in the context of the four basal animal phyla-Porifera, Ctenophores, Placozoans, and Cnidarians-that split off before the bilaterians, a supergroup that incorporates all complex animals.

The animal sensorimotor organization: a challenge for the environmental complexity thesis.

Godfrey-Smith's environmental complexity thesis (ECT) is most often applied to multicellular animals and the complexity of their macroscopic environments to explain how cognition evolved. We think that the ECT may be less suited to explain the origins of the animal bodily organization, including this organization's potentiality for dealing with complex macroscopic environments. We argue that acquiring the fundamental sensorimotor features of the animal body may be better explained as a consequence of dealing with internal bodily-rather than environmental complexity. To press and elucidate this option, we develop the notion of an animal sensorimotor organization (ASMO) that derives from an internal coordination account for the evolution of early nervous systems. The ASMO notion is a reply to the question how a collection of single cells can become integrated such that the resulting multicellular organization becomes sensitive to and can manipulate macroscopic features of both the animal body and its environment. In this account, epithelial contractile tissues play the central role in the organization behind complex animal bodies. In this paper, we relate the ASMO concept to recent work on epithelia, which provides empirical evidence that supports central assumptions behind the ASMO notion. Second, we discuss to what extent the notion applies to basic animal architectures, exemplified by sponges and jellyfish. We conclude that the features exhibited by the ASMO are plausibly explained by internal constraints acting on and within this multicellular organization, providing a challenge for the role the ECT plays in this context.

Aesthetic perception and its minimal content: a naturalistic perspective.

Aesthetic perception is one of the most interesting topics for philosophers and scientists who investigate how it influences our interactions with objects and states of affairs. Over the last few years, several studies have attempted to determine "how aesthetics is represented in an object," and how a specific feature of an object could evoke the respective feelings during perception. Despite the vast number of approaches and models, we believe that these explanations do not resolve the problem concerning the conditions under which aesthetic perception occurs, and what constitutes the content of these perceptions. Adopting a naturalistic perspective, we here view aesthetic perception as a normative process that enables agents to enhance their interactions with physical and socio-cultural environments. Considering perception as an anticipatory and preparatory process of detection and evaluation of indications of potential interactions (what we call "interactive affordances"), we argue that the minimal content of aesthetic perception is an emotionally valued indication of interaction potentiality. Aesthetic perception allows an agent to normatively anticipate interaction potentialities, thus increasing sense making and reducing the uncertainty of interaction. This conception of aesthetic perception is compatible with contemporary evidence from neuroscience, experimental aesthetics, and interaction design. The proposed model overcomes several problems of transcendental, art-centered, and objective aesthetics as it offers an alternative to the idea of aesthetic objects that carry inherent values by explaining "the aesthetic" as emergent in perception within a context of uncertain interaction.